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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
EMERALD OIL COMPANY, a corpo- *
ration,
Plaintiff,
vs.
>
STATE TAX
UTAH,

COMMISSION

Case No
7984

OF

Defendant.

/

Petition For Rehearing
And Brief In Support Thereof

TO THE HONORABLE MEMBERS OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF UTAH:
Plaintiff respectfully petitions the court to grant a
rehearing in the above entitled cause on the ground that
the court erred in presuming as a matter of law that the
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income of plaintiff, a domestic corporation, was attributable to business carried on in Utah, and therefore, subject
to the franchise tax imposed by Title 59, Chapter 13, Utah
Code Annotated 1953.

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts are undisputed and are stated fully in the
original brief filed by plaintiff in this case.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. The presumption of law that plaintiff was doing
business in Utah within the purview of the Utah statute
is contrary to the facts and in direct conflict with established law on this subject.
2. The evidence in this case, which is not in conflict,
shows that plaintiff transacted no business in Utah which
yielded the income upon which the franchise tax is based.

ARGUMENT
POINT NO. 1
THE PRESUMPTION OF LAW THAT PLAINT I F F WAS DOING BUSINESS IN UTAH
WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF THE UTAH
STATUTE IS CONTRARY TO THE FACTS
AND IN DIRECT CONFLICT WITH ESTABLISHED LAW ON THIS SUBJECT.
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The opinion written by Chief Justice Wolfe contains
the following statement, upon which the decision in this
case must rest:
"A domestic corporation organized for purposes of profit and which receives income must be
doing business somewhere. If the petitioner cannot
be said to be doing business in Colorado so as to
justify the allocation to Colorado of a portion of
its net income derived from 'business done' there,
the income received by such corporation is presumed
to be allocable to Utah."
The foregoing statement is sheer judicial tax legislation, deriving no support from the language expressed in
the statute and in direct conflict with the rule of law firmly
established by the decisions of many state and federal
courts which were cited in our original brief and some of
which heretofore have been cited with approval by this
court. The same proposition as contained in the quoted
pronouncement of Chief Justice Wolfe was advanced by
the Attorney General of the State of New York and rejected
by the highest court of that state. People V. Knapp, 229
N. Y. 502, 128 N. E. 892. Justice Collin of the Court of
Appeals of New York, in construing the New York franchise tax statute, held:
"It is not correct reasoning to assert that the
relator must be doing business in New York because
it was not doing business in New Jersey. A corporation is not more bound to pursue the activities of
business than is the private citizen. It may, as may
he, enter into and then retire from business, or refrain from business. Nor is every exercise of its
chartered powers and purposes the doing of business
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within the purview of the Tax Law. We hold that
under the facts presented the relator was not, within the year ending October 31, 1916, doing business
in this state within the intendment of sections 181
and 182 of the Tax Law."

POINT NO. 2
THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE, WHICH IS
NOT IN CONFLICT, SHOWS THAT PLAINTIFF TRANSACTED NO BUSINESS IN UTAH
WHICH YIELDED THE INCOME UPON
WHICH THE FRANCHISE TAX IS BASED.
We, of course, concur in the courts holding that:
'Though not an income tax, the amount of the franchise
tax a corporation must pay in Utah is based on the income
yielded from exercising the privilege of doing business or
exercising the corporation franchise in Utah" (emphasis
ours). We argued for such interpretation of the statute
in our original brief. (Pages 13 and 14 of plaintiff's original brief.) The State Tax Commission argued against it
which it logically must do to sustain its position. (Pages
10 and 11 of defendant's reply brief.)
The presumption indulged in by Chief Justic Wolfe
that plaintiff was doing business in Utah during the taxable years in question is of necessity a presumption of law:
All the evidence relating to this subject is in the record
and before the court. It shows that prior to the taxable
years in question, plaintiff ceased to be an operating company because it had granted to a third party completely
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and exclusively the right to remove all the oil and gas from
its Colorado lands for which it reserved certain royalties
which, in turn, became its sole source of revenue. Plaintiff maintained its corporate entity merely as a conduit
to distribute the net proceeds of such royalties and the activities of its officers in Utah consisted only of the management of its internal affairs.
By no stretch of the imagination could the income upon
which the tax is imposed under this decision be attributable
to any gainful pursuit carried on by plaintiff in the State
of Utah. An examination of the items listed in the last
paragraph of the opinion as "petitioners business activities
in Utah" to "bolster" the presumption relied upon to sustain the decision herein, will clearly disclose that nothing
therein listed contributed in any manner whatsoever to
produce the royalties received by plaintiff from its oil and
gas leases covering lands in the State of Colorado. The
best evidence of this was gratuitously included in the record in this case by the State Tax Commission which shows
that subsequent to the taxable years in question, the company was completely liquidated and dissolved and all its
properties in Colorado were distributed in kind to its
stockholders, who now receive directly the royalties formerly received indirectly through the corporate conduit.
Can it even be imagined that these royalties presently received by the former stockholders of the company are attributable to business carried on by them in Utah?
The authorities uniformly hold, under the facts as established in this case, that a corporation is not doing bus-
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iness within the purview of the franchise tax statute because, as pointed out by the court in People V. Knapp
(supra), the so called "business activities" of plaintiff "related to the management of its internal affairs, the owning
and holding of property, and the distribution of its avails,
and were not exercised *for the purpose of continued efforts
in the pursuit of profit and gain/ " See also: Eisner v.
United American Utilities, (Del.) 180 Atl. 590; State V.
Anniston Rolling Mills, 125 Ala. 121, 27 So. 921; People
V. Pestner, 78 N. Y. Supp. 1017; Norman V. Southwestern
R. Company, 42 Ga. App. 812, 157 S. E. 531; McCoach V.
Minehill Railway Company, 228 U. S. 295; Flint v. Tracy
Company, 220 U. S. 107; American Jurisprudence, Volume
51, Page 714, Section 796; American Law Reports, Volume
124, Page 1110; Cottonwood Coal Company v. Junod, 73
Mont. 392, 236 P. 1080; State v. J. C. Maguire Const. Co.,
113 Mont. 324, 125 P. 2d 433; United States V. Emery Bird,
Thayer Realty Co., 237 U. S. 28, 35 S. Ct. 499, 59 L. Ed.
825.
We cited most of these authorities in our original brief;
but they were neither mentioned nor commented upon in
the opinion of Chief Justice Wolfe. The decision in the
present case has no support from the opinion in the case
of / . M. and M. S. Browning Co. v. State Tax Commission,
107 Utah 457, 154 P. 2d 993. To the contrary, the Browning case rests firmly on the proposition that the amount of
the franchise tax which a corporation must pay in Utah
is based on income which is produced from and directly
attributable to its transaction of business in Utah. The
departure of Chief Justice Wolfe from the settled rule of
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law announced by the foregoing decisions is not supported
by the citation of a single judicial decision; ironically, to
sustain the same, reference is made to some regulation
promulgated by the defendant, itself.

CONCLUSION
The decision in this case rests upon the promulgation
of a rule which is a drastic departure from the well settled
law as established by numerous decisions of the courts of
other states and of the United States. Its impact will
prejudicially discriminate against many corporations domiciled in Utah and the citizens of this state. It will result
in double taxation, as it does in this case, which the legislature has expressly declared against. If this decision stands,
many domestic corporations in the course of time will be
driven into dissolution or emigration from their domicile
in this state. Many more, whose organizers might have
desired a Utah domicile, will forego the dubious privilege
of making their corporate home in Utah.
We believe that before this court finally decides to
adopt a rule of law contrary to that of other jurisdictions,
with the harmful results which inevitably will follow, it
should grant a rehearing at which the authorities pertinent
to this case and the practical effect of this decision can be
fully argued and considered. If this is done, we will endeavor to show and persuade this court that this decision
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is contrary to established legal principles and against the
public policy of this state.
Respectfully submitted,
C. E. HENDERSON, of
RAY, RAWLINS,
JONES & HENDERSON,
Attorneys for Plaintiff.
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